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Policing Discovery Under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 219(c): A Search for Judicial
Consistency
I. INTRODUCTION
The modem system of discovery arose from the desire to make
the judicial process a joint search for the truth "rather than... a
battle of wits between counsel, where shock and surprise rule the
result."' Although the discovery rules were designed to eliminate
the "combat theory ' 2 of litigation, attorneys must comply with the
rules in order to achieve the goals of discovery. Many attorneys,
however, ignore the rules and use discovery as a tactical game to
impede the truth-seeking process by delaying litigation.3
The judiciary's most powerful tools for solving problems of noncompliance are sanctions for abuse of discovery.' The ultimate
goal of such sanctions is not to punish a party for deviating from
the discovery rules but to ensure compliance with the rules in order
to reach a trial on the merits. 5 At the same time, it is often neces1. Payne v. Coates-Miller, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 3d 601, 606, 386 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1st
Dist. 1979). "Modem instruments of discovery... make a trial less a game of blind man's
bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." Id. (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682
(1958)); see Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 67, 374 N.E.2d 460, 467 (1975) (the ascertainment of truth and disclosure is the object of discovery).
2. Payne, 68 I11.App. 3d at 606, 386 N.E.2d at 402; see also R. MICHAEL, CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, § 31.3 (1989) (discussion of modern discovery and the adversarial tradition).
3. Williams v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 83 Ill. 2d 559, 565, 416 N.E.2d 252, 255 (1981).
The court in Williams stated:
When an attorney attempts to use discovery rules and sanctions as weapons in a
war of inconvenience, instead of the truth-seeking purposes for which they were
designed, he does a disservice not only to the court and his colleagues at the bar,
but also to his client, since his pettifogging makes more difficult a realistic view
of the merits of the client's claim or defense.
Id.
4. The phrase "abuse of discovery" encompasses both overdiscovery and resistance to
discovery (noncompliance). Overdiscovery involves burdening an adversary with excessive discovery requests; noncompliance involves obstruction of an adversary's discovery.
Discovery sanctions for noncompliance are the focus of this Comment. See generally
Ebersole, Discovery Problems:Is Help on the Way?, 66 A.B.A. J. 50, 51-52 (1980) (distinguishing between noncompliance and overdiscovery problems); Johnston, Discovery in
Illinois and FederalCourts, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1982); Comment, Recent Trends
in the Enforcement of Discovery: Sanctions in the Federal Courts and in Illinois, 11 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 773 (1980).
5. Mueller v. Insurance Benefit Adm'rs, 175 Ill. App. 3d 587, 598, 529 N.E.2d 1126,
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sary to end litigation as a sanction for noncompliance. Such a severe sanction has the effect of deciding a case on procedural
grounds rather than on the substantive merits of a claim. Thus, the
judiciary is continuously called upon to resolve the inherent problem of discovery sanctions, i.e., striking a balance between a rigid
system of procedural rules and the disposition of cases on their
merits.
The purpose of this Comment is to determine whether the Illinois system of sanctioning discovery violations strikes the proper
balance between rigid procedural rules and trials on the merits and
to suggest possible changes for "just"6 and reasonable control over
the discovery process. This Comment will first explore the historical background of discovery in Illinois, focusing on Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 219(c), which provides sanctions for noncompliance with discovery. Second, it will discuss Illinois case law to
determine what constitutes sanctionable conduct and what considerations make particular sanctions appropriate. Finally, this Comment will analyze whether the Illinois judiciary is meeting the
goals of discovery in its application of sanctions and will suggest
several improvements for the current system of sanctioning discovery violations.
II. BACKGROUND
Pretrial discovery was virtually unknown at common law 7 and
limited to actions in equity.8 To prepare his case, a litigant could
obtain information only by filing a bill of discovery in a separate,
equitable proceeding.9 The bill of discovery did not extend to non1133 (lst Dist. 1988); Cedric Spring & Assocs. v. N.E.I. Corp., 81 In.App. 3d 1031,
1035, 402 N.E.2d 352, 356 (2d Dist. 1980) ("The purpose of imposing sanctions under
[Rule] 219(c) is to compel cooperation rather than to dispose of litigation as a means of
punishing the noncomplying party. ... A court may not invoke sanctions which are
designed to impose punishment rather than to achieve or effect the objects of discovery."
(citations omitted)).
6. ILL. S. CT.R. 219(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 219(c) (1987). Rule 219(c)
provides that the trial court must award only sanctions that are "just." Id.
7. The only method at common law to obtain facts prior to trial was through the bill
of particulars. The bill of particulars required certain facts to be established in a pleading.
The bill apprised a party of his opponent's basic allegations but did not establish all
relevant facts needed to prove his case. R. JOHNSTON & K. KANDARAS, DISCOVERY IN
ILLINOIS 3 (1985); MICHAEL, supra note 2, § 31.1. See, e.g., Colby v. Wilson, 320 In.416,
420-22, 151 N.E. 269, 270-71 (1926).
8. In a proceeding in equity, depositions and sworn statements were used to support a
claim for equitable relief. JOHNSTON & KANDARAS, supra note 7, at 2-3; see also Vennum
v. Davis, 35 Ill.
568, 577 (1864) (discovery was used in equity only when evidence was
exclusively within a party's knowledge).
9. JOHNSTON & KANDARAS, supra note 7, at 3; MICHAEL, supra note 2, § 31.1.
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parties and was limited in scope to material facts relevant to the
legal action.10 Thus, the litigants proceeded without knowledge of
all relevant facts. As a result, the skillful maneuvering of counsel,
rather than the merits of a case, determined the outcome of a typical common law trial."1
The impracticability of this system prompted the legislature to
enact section 58 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,12 presently paragraph 2-1003 of the Code of Civil Procedure.1 3 The modem rules
permit discovery in a single action at law and allow discovery to be
initiated against nonparties.' 4 To promote the free flow of information, the rules encourage informal cooperation among litigants
with minimal judicial interference.1 5 Accordingly, the modem
rules enhance the truth-seeking process through disclosure of all
relevant facts, 6 thus permitting resolution of cases on the merits
7
rather than on technical procedural rules.
Adoption of the discovery rules, however, did not secure complete disclosure of information or eliminate an adversarial disclosure process. The adversarial tradition continues to flourish in
modem discovery by parties simply avoiding or delaying compliance with the discovery rules.'" To achieve the goals of discovery
and insure compliance with the discovery rules, the Illinois
JOHNSTON & KANDARAS, supra note 7, at 3; MICHAEL, supra note 2, § 31.1.
11. King v. American Food Equip. Co., 160 I11. App. 3d 898, 910, 513 N.E.2d 958,
966 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 117 Il1.2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1087 (1987); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientationin the Imposition of Severe Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033,
1033 n.2 (1978).
12. 1955 111. Laws 2264.

10.

13.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1003 (1987).

14. JOHNSTON & KANDARAS, supra note 7, at 5; see also Krupp v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 8 Ill. 2d 37, 39-41, 132 N.E.2d 532, 535 (1956) (discussion of the broadened scope
of discovery under the modern rules).
15. Spiller v. Continental Tube Co., 95 Ill. 2d 423, 431, 447 N.E.2d 834, 838 (1983).
Rule 201(k) provides that each motion relating to discovery should contain a statement
that "after personal consultation and reasonable attempts to resolve differences the parties have been unable to reach an accord." ILL. S. CT. R. 201(k), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, para. 201(k) (1987). Literal compliance with Rule 201(k) usually is unnecessary if
the record reflects reasonable attempts to resolve the difficulties. Lavaja v. Carter, 150 Ill.
App. 3d 317, 325, 505 N.E.2d 694, 699 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 116 Ill.2d 560, 515
N.E.2d 110 (1987); see, e.g, Williams v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 83 Ill. 2d 559, 566, 416
N.E.2d 252, 256 (1981) (proof of unsuccessful efforts at consultation, including numerous
telephone calls or unreturned letters may suffice).
16. JOHNSTON & KANDARAS, supra note 7, at 5.
17. See Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 67, 374 N.E.2d 460, 467 (1978).
18. MICHAEL, supra note 2, § 35.3; Note, FederalRules of Civil Procedure:Defining a
Feasible Culpability Thresholdfor the Imposition of Severe Sanctions, 65 MINN. L. REv.
137 (1980).
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Supreme Court adopted Supreme Court Rule 219(c), 19 modeled after its federal counterpart, Rule 37(b) of the Federal Code of Civil
Procedure." ° Rule 219(c) gives the trial court broad discretion to
police discovery2 1 and provides a nonexhaustive list of possible
sanctions.22 Among them, the Rule authorizes the trial court to
stay proceedings, 23 debar the offending party from filing further
19. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 219(c) (1987). Rule 219(c)
provides:
If a party, or any person at the instance of or in collusion with a party, unreasonably refuses to comply with any provision of Part E of article II of the rules
of this court (Discovery, Requests for Admission, and Pretrial Procedure) or
fails to comply with any order entered under these rules, the court, on motion,
may enter, in addition to remedies elsewhere specifically provided, such orders
as are just, including, among others, the following:
(i) that further proceeding be stayed until the order or rule is complied with;
(ii) that the offending party be debarred from filing any other pleading relating
to any issue to which the refusal relates;
(iii) that he be debarred from maintaining any particular claim, counterclaim,
third-party complaint, or defense relating to that issue;
(iv) that a witness be barred from testifying concerning that issue;
(v) that, as to claims or defenses asserted in any pleading to which that issue is
material, a judgment by default be entered against the offending party or
that his action be dismissed with or without prejudice; or
(vi) that any portion of his pleadings relating to that issue be stricken and, if
thereby made appropriate judgment entered as to that issue.
In lieu of or in addition to the foregoing, the court may order that the offending
party or his attorney pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees incurred by any party as a result of the misconduct, and by contempt proceedings
compel obedience by any party or person to any subpoena issued or order entered under the rules. Notwithstanding the entry of a judgment or an order of
dismissal, whether voluntary or involuntary, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, any order
imposing monetary sanctions, including orders as may be entered on motions
which were pending hereunder prior to the filing of a notice or motion seeking a
judgment or order of dismissal.
Id.
20. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b). Unlike Federal Rule 37(b), Illinois Supreme Court Rule
219(c) distinguishes between sanctions for overuse of discovery and sanctions for noncompliance with discovery requests. Sanctions for overuse of discovery are provided in
ILL. S. Cr. R. 219(d), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 0A, para. 219(d) (1987), which provides:
The court may order that information obtained through abuse of discovery procedures be suppressed. If a party wilfully obtains or attempts to obtain information by an improper discovery method, wilfully obtains or attempts to obtain
information to which he is not entitled, or otherwise abuses these discovery
rules, the court may enter any order provided for in paragraph (c) of this rule.
See supra note 4.
21. Nehring v. First Nat'l Bank, 145 Ill. App. 3d 791, 796-97, 493 N.E.2d 1119, 1124
(2d Dist. 1986).
22. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. l1l0A, para. 219(c) (1987). The Rule
provides, however, that the order given must be "just." Id
23. Id. para. 219(c)(i).
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pleadings,24 debar the maintaining of a claim or defense,25 debar a
witness' testimony, 26 enter adf
a default judgment or dismiss the suit
with or without prejudice, 27 and strike any portion of the pleadings.28 In addition, courts can award attorney's fees,2 9 institute
contempt proceedings 30 and, in certain circumstances, order a new
31
trial.

Rule 219(c) purports to strike a balance between enforcing dis24. Id. para. 219(c)(ii).
25. Id. para. 219(c)(iii); see, e.g., Estate of Stevenson, 44 Ill. 2d 525, 527, 256 N.E.2d
766, 767, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (party failed to appear for mental examination
and was barred from maintaining a defense relating to her mental capacity).
26. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c)(iv), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 219(c)(iv) (1987); see,
e.g., Ashford v. Ziemann, 99 Ill. 2d 353, 372, 459 N.E.2d 940, 949 (1984) (trial court
should have excluded witness); In re Henry, 175 Ill. App. 3d 778, 789-90, 530 N.E.2d
571, 578 (2d Dist. 1988) (failure to exclude witness was proper); c.f. Hawkins v. Wiggins,
92 Ill. App. 3d 278, 288, 415 N.E.2d 1179, 1186 (1st Dist. 1980) (excluded tax returns as
evidence of damages).
27. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c)(v), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 219(c)(v) (1987); see,
e.g., Skees v. Growmark, Inc., 158 I11. App. 3d 842, 847-48, 511 N.E.2d 982, 986 (3d
Dist.), appealdenied, 117 Ill. 2d 554, 517 N.E.2d 1096 (1987) (dismissal proper sanction);
King v. American Food Equip. Co., 160 ll. App. 3d 898, 913, 513 N.E.2d 958, 967 (1st
Dist.), appeal denied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1087 (1987) (same); Lavaja v. Carter,
153 Ill. App. 3d 317, 324, 505 N.E.2d 694, 699 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d 560,
515 N.E.2d 110 (1987) (default judgment proper sanction); Estate of Soderholm, 127 Ill.
App. 3d 871, 881, 469 N.E.2d 410, 417 (1st Dist. 1984) (same). But see Vortanz v. Elmhurst Memorial Hosp., 179 I1. App. 3d 584, 590, 534 N.E.2d 625, 629 (2d Dist. 1989)
(dismissal improper in this case).
28. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c)(vi), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 219(c)(vi) (1987); see,
e.g., Barnes v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 135 I11.App. 3d 700, 709, 481 N.E.2d 1200,
1206 (1st Dist. 1984) (striking pleading improper sanction); Central Nat'l Bank v. Baime,
112 Ill. App. 3d 664, 668-69, 445 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (1982) (same).
29. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 219(c) (1987); see, e.g.,
Martzaklis v. 5559 Belmont Corp., 157 Ill. App. 3d 731, 733, 510 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (1st
Dist. 1987) (attorney's fees proper sanction); Savitch v. Allman, 25 Ill. App. 3d 864, 870,
323 N.E.2d 435, 440 (3d Dist. 1975) (same). But see 10-Dix Bldg. Corp. v. Mc Dannel,
134 Ill. App. 3d 664, 674-75, 480 N.E.2d 1212, 1220 (1st Dist. 1985) (attorney's fees
improper).
30. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 219(c) (1987); see, e.g.,
Payne v. Coates-Miller, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 3d 601, 609, 386 N.E.2d 398, 405 (1st Dist.
1979) (criminal contempt proper sanction); Bauter v. Reding, 68 Ill. App. 3d 171, 174,
385 N.E.2d 886, 889 (3d Dist. 1979) (civil contempt not proper); see also Ritter v. Rush
Presbyterian-St. Luke's, 177 Ill. App. 3d 313, 322, 532 N.E.2d 327, 333 (1st Dist. 1988)
(contempt of court finding for violation of the discovery rules may be classified as civil
contempt, although it is more akin to criminal contempt).
31. Drehle v. Fleming, 49 Ill. 2d 293, 298, 274 N.E.2d 53, 56 (1971). But see Tinsey
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 140 Ill. App. 3d 546, 549, 488 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (1st Dist.
1986) (awarding new trial as sanction improper). Because the sanctions provided in Rule
219(c) are not exclusive, a court allowed a jury instruction regarding the party's noncompliance in LeMaster v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 101112, 343 N.E.2d 65, 75 (1st Dist. 1976) (appellate court held that the instruction was
within the court's discretion).
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covery rules and resolving cases on the merits. 32 As with all discovery sanctions, the goal of the Rule is not to punish parties for
noncompliance, but to unearth the merits of the case by compelling
compliance with the rules.33 In the recent past, however, sanctions
increasingly have been viewed as an effective deterrent for future
abuse of discovery. This secondary function requires the court to
choose a sanction that is both a meaningful deterrent and a
nonpunitive measure.34
The effort to strike a balance between resolving a particular case
on the merits and deterring future violations has created two theories of sanctioning discovery violations. The first, the remedial theory, emphasizes the goal of achieving compliance with discovery in
order to get to the merits of a case. 35 The second, the deterrent
theory, stresses the use of severe sanctions to curb noncompliance
in the judicial system as a whole.36 Attaining the proper balance
between these two extremes has presented the judiciary with an as
yet unresolved dilemma.
III.

ILLINOIS CASE LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A CONSISTENT
STANDARD

The imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with discovery
requires the trial court to engage in a two-step analysis. 37 First, the
court determines whether a party's action constitutes sanctionable
conduct. Sanctionable conduct is an "unreasonable" refusal to
comply with the discovery rules or a failure to comply with a discovery order.3s Second, if the conduct is sanctionable, the court
determines the appropriate sanction, if any, to be imposed. 39 At
32. MICHAEL, supra note 2, § 35.4.
33. In re Henry, 175 Ill. App. 3d 778, 786, 530 N.E.2d 571, 576 (2d Dist. 1988)
("The court must seek to accomplish discovery rather than inflict punishment"); see
supra note 5; infra note 115 (discussing sanctions as punishment).
34. See infra note 124 and accompanying text for a discussion of the deterrent value
of sanctions.
35. See Note, supra note 11, at 1034; Note, supra note 18, at 141; see also infra notes
107-27 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of the remedial theory.
36. See Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A JudicialPerspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264
(1979); see also infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (criticism of remedial
approach).
37. See, e.g., Perimeter Exhibits, Ltd. v. Glenbard Molded Binder, Inc., 122 Ill. App.
3d 504, 512-14, 461 N.E.2d 44, 51-53 (2d Dist. 1984).
38. Campen v. Executive House Hotel Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 576, 587, 434 N.E.2d
511, 518 (1st Dist. 1982). ILL. S. Cr. R. 219(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1lOA, para. 219(c)
distinguishes between "unreasonable refusal" to comply with rules and a mere "failure"
to comply with orders. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text, discussing statutory definitions of sanctionable conduct.
39. Whether a sanction will be imposed at all is discretionary, just as determining the
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both stages of analysis, the trial court has vast discretion. Absent
abuse of that discretion,
an appellate court will not overturn the
4
trial court's decision. 0
A.

DeterminingSanctionable Conduct: "Unreasonable"
Noncompliance

Prior to imposing a sanction, the trial court first must determine
whether a party's conduct constitutes an "unreasonable" refusal to
comply with discovery. Determining whether a party's noncompliance is "unreasonable" is a question of fact with the burden of
proof on the complainant. 4 ' Once the court finds noncompliance,
the burden shifts to the offending party to tender an excuse that
justifies the noncompliance.42 The Illinois Supreme Court has not
defined "unreasonable refusal to comply" under Rule 219(c).43
The appellate courts, however, have identified certain standards by
which unreasonable noncompliance may be determined.
Under the most frequently applied standard, conduct is unreasonable if it is "characterized by deliberate and pronounced disregard for the rule or order not complied with or whether the action
of the party shows a deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the court's authority."" This standard was applied in
King v. American Food Equipment Co. 45 In King, the trial court
appropriate sanction. Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 524, 531, 504
N.E.2d 772, 777 (1st Dist. 1987); see also White v. Henrotin Hosp. Corp., 78 Ill. App. 3d
1024, 1027-28, 398 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1st Dist. 1979) (trial court, within its discretion, may
impose sanctions).
40. Suttles v. Vogel, 160 Ill. App. 3d 464, 472, 513 N.E.2d 563, 570 (4th Dist. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds, 126 Ill. 2d 186, 533 N.E.2d 901 (1988) (did not address whether
trial court abused its discretion); Estate of Soderholm, 127 Ill. App. 3d 871, 879, 469
N.E.2d 410, 416 (1st Dist. 1984).
41. See Michael, supra note 2, § 35.3 n.16.
42. See, e.g., Marriage of Kutchins, 157 Ill. App. 3d 384, 390, 510 N.E.2d 1300, 1304
(2d Dist.), appealdenied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1087 (1987) (argument that scope of
court order for mental examination was improper and justified noncompliance was refused); Hawkins v. Wiggins, 92 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282-83, 415 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (1st Dist.
1980) (fact that tax returns were not in party's custody did not excuse failure to comply
with request to produce); White v. Henrotin Hosp. Corp., 78 Ill. App. 1025, 1030, 398
N.E.2d 24, 28 (1st Dist. 1979) (claiming to have no notice of deposition date did not
excuse noncompliance but was relevant to determining appropriate sanction). But see
Vortanz v. Elmhurst Memorial Hosp., 179 Ill. App. 584, 591, 534 N.E.2d 625, 630 (2d
Dist. 1989) (lack of control over expert appearing at deposition was a valid excuse).
43. Wilkens v. T. Enters., Inc., 177 111. App. 3d 514, 517, 532 N.E.2d 469, 471 (1st
Dist. 1988).
44. King v. American Food Equip. Co., 160 Ill. App. 3d 898, 911, 513 N.E.2d 958,
966 (1st Dist.), appealdenied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1087 (1987); see also Wilkens,
177 Ill. App. 3d at 517, 532 N.E.2d at 471.
45. 160 Ill. App. 3d at 911, 513 N.E.2d at 966.
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explicitly inquired whether all discovery matters were complete
and whether the defendant intended to use any unproduced evidence at trial. 46 The defendant informed the court that all discovery requests were complete and that no new evidence would be
introduced.47 During the trial, however, the defendant introduced
a critical piece of evidence that had not been disclosed during discovery. 4" The trial court held that the defendant's conduct was a
"gross violation of the discovery rules" and dismissed the case.49
The appellate court affirmed, ruling that the defendant's conduct
was deliberate and contumacious.50
In Nehring v. First National Bank,5 the court also applied the
deliberate and contumacious standard to find unreasonable conduct. There, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
action because plaintiff failed to produce documents.5 2 The plaintiff claimed that it was impossible to comply with the production
request because the documents were stolen.5 3 The appellate court
determined that if the documents were stolen, then the plaintiff had
complied fully with the request; 54 however, the court refused to
view the plaintiff's compliance in a vacuum. Rather, in determining whether the party's conduct was unreasonable, the court considered the plaintiff's conduct throughout the entire course of the
46. Id. at 911-12, 513 N.E.2d at 967.
47. Id. at 912, 513 N.E.2d at 967.
48. Id. King involved a products liability action against a manufacturer of a meat
mixing machine. Id. at 902, 513 N.E.2d 960-61. The defendant (third-party plaintiff),
introduced evidence of a "fifth pin" for mounting the machine that implied that the employer (third-party defendant) had failed to mount the machine properly. Id. at 912, 513
N.E.2d at 967.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 911, 513 N.E.2d 966-67. The defendant also introduced a written statement
of the third-party defendant that was obtained although the defendant assured the party's
counsel that no statement would be taken. Id. at 912, 513 N.E.2d at 967. The appellate
court determined that the defendant's conduct revealed a "pronounced pattern of deliberate and blatant disregard of the discovery rules." Id. at 911, 513 N.E.2d at 967. The King
court mentioned in passing that factors to determine unreasonable conduct include: (1)
surprise to the opposing party; (2) prejudicial effect of the testimony; (3) diligence of the
opposing party; (4) timely objection; and (5) good faith of the offending party. Id. As
discussed infra at notes 74 and 141, these factors usually are not considered in finding
unreasonable conduct, but are considered in evaluating the propriety of an exclusionary
sanction.
51. 143 Il. App. 3d 791, 493 N.E.2d 1119 (2d Dist. 1986).
52. Id. at 794, 493 N.E.2d at 1122. In Nehring, a customer brought a conversion
action against a bank for turning over a bag of coins to the sheriff pursuant to an execution and levy. Id. at 793, 493 N.E.2d 1121. The requested documents allegedly established the plaintiff's ownership of the coins and their amount and value. Id. at 800, 493
N.E.2d at 1126.
53. Id. at 795-96, 493 N.E.2d at 1123.
54. Id. at 799, 493 N.E.2d at 1125.
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litigation." The court concluded that the failure to produce was
but another step in a course of conduct that demonstrated a deliberate and contumacious disregard for the rules of discovery.56
A second standard for determining unreasonableness permits a
finding of sanctionable conduct if a party merely is negligent. 57 For
example, in White v. Henrotin Hospital Corp." the plaintiff failed to
appear at a scheduled deposition. The plaintiff's attorney claimed
his conduct was not unreasonable because he did not receive notice
of the deposition date.59 The trial court noted that the attorney
was not excused from complying with the discovery rules merely
because he did not receive notice of the deposition; an attorney has
an affirmative duty to check the court files and to keep current
with a case. 6° His conduct, although unintentional, was therefore
sanctionable. 6 '
Similarly, in Wilkens v. T Enterprises, Inc. ,62 an attorney for
nine plaintiffs in a consolidated case failed to answer interrogatories in a timely manner.63 The appellate court determined that the
attorney's careless conduct, though unintentional, was sanctionable under Rule 219(c). 61
55. Id. at 802, 493 N.E.2d at 1127.
56. Id. at 802-03, 493 N.E.2d at 1127-28. The continued noncompliance involved
delay for over a year, a dozen unwritten requests, uncounted phone calls, and two motions to dismiss before the plaintiff finally agreed to take a deposition. Id. at 802, 493
N.E.2d at 1127. Although a pattern of dilatory conduct is the most common example of
unreasonable behavior, a single instance of noncompliance also can be unreasonable. For
example, in Marriage of Kutchins, 157 Ill. App. 3d 384, 389-90, 510 N.E.2d 1300, 1304
(2d Dist.), appeal denied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1087 (1987), the trial court held
that a party's failure to appear at a court-ordered mental examination without a reasonable excuse showed a deliberate disregard for the court's authority.
57. See, e.g., Wilkens v. T. Enters., Inc., 177 Ill. App. 3d 514, 517-18, 532 N.E.2d
469, 471 (1st Dist. 1988); White v. Henrotin Hosp. Corp., 78 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1027, 398
N.E.2d 24, 26 (1st Dist. 1979).
58. White, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 1026, 398 N.E.2d at 25.
59. Id. at 1027, 398 N.E.2d at 26.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1029-30, 398 N.E.2d at 27-28. Although the appellate court ruled that the
conduct was unreasonable, the court reversed the trial court because the sanction of dismissal was too severe and conditioned reinstatement upon the plaintiff's compliance. Id.
at 1030-31, 398 N.E.2d at 28.
62. 177 Ill. App. 3d 514, 532 N.E.2d 469 (1st Dist. 1988).
63. Id. at 515, 532 N.E.2d at 470.
64. Id. at 517-18, 532 N.E.2d at 471. The plaintiffs in Wilkens sought recovery for
injuries sustained by food poisoning received at a wedding reception. Id. at 515, 532
N.E.2d at 469. The defendant's discovery requests totalled thirty-four pages for each
case. Id. at 518, 532 N.E.2d 471. At the time of the sanction hearing, six of the nine
requests had been filed. Id. at 516, 532 N.E.2d at 470. See also O'Brien v. Stefaniak, 130
Ill. App. 2d 398, 398-405, 264 N.E.2d 781, 781, 785 (1st Dist. 1970). In O'Brien, the trial
court found that the plaintiff's failure to name a witness in response to interrogatories
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A third standard for determining unreasonable noncompliance
focuses on the importance of the undisclosed information, rather
than on the fault of the offending party. This standard was set forth
in Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Shevlin-Manning,Inc.,65 in which the trial
court sanctioned a party for failing to produce, during discovery,
evidence that the party later introduced at trial. 66 The party argued that its failure to disclose was inadvertent, and therefore was
not unreasonable. The appellate court, however, held that "the test
of whether or not a failure to disclose is unreasonable does not rest
upon whether the failure was intentional or inadvertent ....The
test is how important the undisclosed information is."'67 Under
this third standard, a finding of fault, whether intentional or negligent, is not a prerequisite to a finding of sanctionable conduct.
Another approach used by the courts, although not an articulated standard, gauges the unreasonableness of an offending party's
noncompliance by the conduct of the opposing party. In Spiller v.
Continental Tube Co. ,68 the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action for failure to produce a witness for a deposition. The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, emphasizing the necessary
cooperation between counsel to resolve disputes before seeking judicial intervention. 69 The court held that the delays and difficulties in completing discovery were the fault of both parties; thus, the
was unintentional and due to poor investigation. Id. at 405, 264 N.E.2d at 785. The
appellate court, however, held that the trial courE properly excluded the testimony of the
witness as a sanction, even though the omission was made in good faith. Id
65. 96 Ill.
App. 3d 207, 421 N.E.2d 562 (3d Dist. 1981).
66. Id. at 208.09, 421 N.E.2d at 564. Ideal involved a counterclaim against shopping
mall owners for work done under a completed contract. Id. at 208-09, 421 N.E.2d 56364. The undisclosed evidence consisted of calculations for the proposed cost of the job.
Id. at 209, 421 N.E.2d at 564.
67. Id. at 210, 421 N.E.2d at 565; see also Nehring v. First Nat'l Bank, 145 Il.App.
3d 791, 800-01, 493 N.E.2d 1119, 1126-27 (2d Dist. 1986) (court indicated that it might
follow the Ideal standard, but the trial court made no findings of the undisclosed information's importance); Eisenbrandt v. Finnegan, 156 Il.App. 3d 968, 972, 509 N.E.2d
1037, 1038 (3d Dist. 1987) (unreasonableness test is the undisclosed information's
importance).
68. 95 Ill. 2d 423, 427, 447 N.E.2d 834, 836 (1983).
69. Id. at 431, 447 N.E.2d at 838. The court indicated that although the defendant
was dilatory in responding to interrogatories, the plaintiffs moved for sanctions primarily
because they were dissatisfied with the responses. Id. at 431, 447 N.E.2d at 837. In doing
so, the plaintiffs ignored the requirements of Rule 201(k). Id. The court went on to say
that "[c]ooperation between counsel and good faith efforts by them to resolve disputes
without judicial intervention are essential to the efficient and expeditious administration
of justice in this State ....
.. "Id. at 431, 447 N.E.2d at 838; see also Presbyterian St.
Luke's Hosp. v. Feil, 75 Ill. App. 3d 438, 444, 394 N.E.2d 537, 541 (1st Dist. 1979)
(failure to answer discovery requests was not unreasonable because both parties were at
fault; the request was large and should have been made earlier).
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plaintiff's conduct was not unreasonable.70
In summary, "unreasonable conduct" is an ambiguous term that
in the appellate courts is judged by several standards. If a party has
disobeyed a discovery rule wilfully, the conduct is probably sanctionable. In contrast, if noncompliance is merely negligent, courts
differ on whether the imposition of a sanction is proper. Further, a
few courts do not factor a party's fault into the analysis; instead
they focus on the importance of the undisclosed information. Finally, the conduct of an adverse party may determine whether a
noncomplying party has acted unreasonably. Because of the differences among the courts in defining unreasonable conduct, the type
of conduct deserving sanctions is uncertain under Rule 219(c).
B. Determining the Appropriate Sanction: "Just Orders"
Because of the unique facts in each case, trial courts have difficulty determining the appropriate sanction, if any, to be imposed
for unreasonable noncompliance with discovery.71 The only limit
on the trial court's discretion is Rule 219(c)'s directive that the
72
sanction be "just.
When a court bars testimony of a witness or evidence as a sanction for nondisclosure, the Illinois Supreme Court has enumerated
the following factors for determining whether the exclusion is a
"just" sanction: (1) surprise to the adverse party; (2) prejudicial
effect; (3) diligence of the adverse party; (4) the making of a timely
objection; and (5) the good faith of the offending party. 73 No sin70. Spiller, 95 Ill. 2d at 430-31, 447 N.E.2d at 837. The court also considered that the
plaintiff did not commence discovery until three and one-half years after filing suit, which
was only three months before the trial date. Id. at 431, 447 N.E.2d at 837.
71. See MICHAEL, supra note 2, § 35.3 (choosing the appropriate sanction creates a
dilemma for the trial courts). One commentator stated that "[o]ne of the most difficult
and one of the most permanent problems which a legal system must face is a combination
of due regard for the claims of substantial justice with a system of procedure rigid enough
to be workable." 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 251 (4th ed. 1936).
72. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 219(c) (1987). A "just
order" is one that "to the degree possible, assures both discovery and trial on the merits."
White v. Henrotin Hosp., Corp., 78 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1028, 398 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1st Dist.
1979); Hansen v. Skul, 54 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3, 369 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1st Dist. 1977). There
are also certain constitutional due process limitations on awarding severe litigation-ending sanctions. See infra notes 159, 167 and accompanying text (related discussion of constitutional limitations on imposition of sanctions).
73. Ashford v. Ziemann, 99 Ill. 2d 353, 369, 459 N.E.2d 940, 947-48 (1984) (citing
Kirkwood v. Checker Taxi Co., 12 Ill. App. 3d 129, 132, 298 N.E.2d 233, 235 (lst Dist.
1973)). In Ashford, a paternity action, the plaintiff requested the defendant to disclose the
names of any men whom the defendant contended had intercourse with the plaintiff. Id.
at 366, 459 N.E.2d at 946. The defendant failed to answer the interrogatory, but after the
plaintiff presented the bulk of her case, he presented testimony of a bartender who

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 21

gle factor is determinative.74
These factors were considered in In re Henry." In Henry, the
State called seventeen witnesses, ten of whom were not disclosed
during discovery. 76 The respondent contended that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to exclude the testimony. 77 On appeal, the court ruled that the respondent did not suffer unfair surprise or prejudice as a result of the nondisclosure, nor did she make
a timely objection to the testimony. 78 Thus, the appellate court
held that the trial court's failure to bar the witnesses' testimony
was not an abuse of discretion.79
The above factors offer some guidance for imposing the lenient
sanction of exclusion,' but they do not provide a solution for
choosing between a severe litigation-ending sanction and a more
lenient sanction that lets the case proceed on its merits."1 To be
claimed he had intercourse with the plaintiff. Id at 366-67, 459 N.E.2d at 946-47. The
trial court allowed the testimony. The appellate court held that the trial court had abused
its discretion. Id. at 368, 459 N.E.2d at 947. The supreme court affirmed and granted a
new trial after concluding that the plaintiff was prejudiced and surprised by the testimony, and, further, that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Id. at 371-71, 459 N.E.2d
at 949.
74. Hawkins v. Wiggins, 92 Il. App. 3d 278, 283, 415 N.E.2d 1179,1182 (1st Dist.
1980). Although the Ashford factors are used in the second stage of the sanction analysis,
Le., determining a "just" sanction, some courts have considered the factors in determining whether misconduct is unreasonable in the first instance. See, e.g., King v. American
Food Equip. Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 898, 911, 513 N.E.2d 958, 967 (1st Dist. 1987), appeal
denied, 117 111. 2d 544, 517 N.E.2d 1087 (1987). See supra note 50, infra note 141 (further
reference to the Ashford factors).
75. 175 Ill. App. 3d 778, 530 N.E.2d 571 (2d Dist. 1988).
76. Id. at 784, 530 N.E.2d at 575. Henry was a parental rights proceeding. The State
called the witnesses to testify that the mother was unfit. Id. at 784-85, 530 N.E.2d at 575.
77. Id. at 785, 530 N.E.2d at 576.
78. Id. at 787-91, 530 N.E.2d at 577-579. Plaintiff admitted at trial that she was prepared for the testimony of certain witnesses; the court held that she objected "far too
late." Id. at 787, 530 N.E.2d at 577.
79. Id. at 789-90, 530 N.E.2d at 578; see also Perez v. Hartman, 187 Ill. App. 3d
1098, 1101-03, 543 N.E.2d 1023, 1025-27 (1st Dist. 1989) (in medical malpractice claim,
exclusion of EKG strip evidencing a cardiac arrest was proper in light of surprise to the
plaintiff, prejudice to the plaintiff, diligence on the part of the plaintiff, plaintiff's timely
objection, and bad faith of the defendant).
80. See JOHNSTON & KANDARAS, supra note 7, at 238-243 (Ashford factors apply to
exclusionary sanctions that are considered lenient sanctions).
81. Traditionally, the exclusion of testimony of a witness or evidence that has not
been disclosed and the imposition of costs or attorneys fees are considered "lenient" sanctions; the litigation ending sanctions of default judgment and dismissal with prejudice are
considered "severe." MICHAEL, supra note 2, § 35.5 n. 1. See also Buehler v. Whalen, 70
Ill. 2d 51, 67, 374 N.E.2d 460, 467 (1978). In Buehler, the supreme court discussed the
sanction of contempt and declared that it "is hardly a sanction in reality. The worst
penalty is the payment of a nominal fine. Meanwhile, the opposing party may well have
been forced to trial without the truth, and truth is the heart of all discovery." Id.
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meaningful, however, a sanction should be proportionate to the
gravity of the violation.82
Most courts impose severe sanctions only when a party's conduct amounts to a willful, "deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the court's authority."83 For example, in
Lavaja v. Carter," the appellate court upheld a default judgment
against the defendant as a sanction for the defendant's noncompliance with discovery rules and orders. In that case, the plaintiff diligently sought discovery, but the defendant continually thwarted
the plaintiff's efforts and flagrantly violated the court's orders to
produce various documents.85 The "defendant's dilatory tactics
[with regard to the production request] demonstrate[d] a deliberate
and pronounced disregard for the court's authority."86 Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the severe sanction of default
judgment against the defendant.8 7
Even if a party's conduct has reached a level of "deliberate and
contumacious disregard for the court's authority," some courts impose a severe sanction only as a "last resort," or when other enforcement powers at the court's disposal have failed to advance
litigation.88 In Kubian v. Labinsky, 9 the appellate court reversed
the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action as a sanction for
her dilatory conduct. The plaintiff in Kubian failed to disclose her
expert witness and neglected to answer Rule 220 Interrogatories9"
82. Buehler, 70 Ill. 2d at 67, 374 N.E.2d at 467.
83. Perimeter Exhibits, Ltd. v. Glenbard Molded Binder, Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 504,
514, 461 N.E.2d 44, 52 (2d Dist. 1984); see also Marriage of Kutchins, 157 Ill. App. 3d
384, 389-90, 510 N.E.2d 1300, 1304 (2d Dist.), appealdenied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 517 N.E.2d
1087 (1987).
84. 153 Ill. App. 3d 317, 324, 505 N.E.2d 694, 699 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 116 Ill.
2d 560, 515 N.E.2d 110 (1987).
85. Id. at 324-25, 505 N.E.2d at 699. Lavaja involved an action to recover on a promissory note. Id. at 319, 505 N.E.2d 695. The defendant received notice to produce evidence. The plaintiff made at least two visits to the defendant's office, but the defendant
failed to produce the evidence. Id. at 523-24, 505 N.E.2d at 698. Further, the court ordered the production twice before entering the default judgment. Id.
86. Id. at 324, 505 N.E.2d at 699.
87. Id. at 326, 505 N.E.2d at 700.
88. Kubian v. Labinsky, 178 Ill. App. 3d 191, 196-97, 533 N.E.2d 22, 25 (1st Dist.),
appeal denied, 123 Ill. 2d 559, 535 N.E.2d 402 (1988); see also Nehring v. First Nat'l
Bank, 143 Ill. App. 3d 791, 805, 493 N.E.2d 1119, 1129 (2d Dist. 1986) ("The sanction of
dismissal... was unwarranted where other 'enforcement powers' at the court's disposal
remained in its arsenal and should have been utilized").
89. 178 Ill. App. 3d at 201-02, 533 N.E.2d at 28-29.
90. ILL. S. Cr. R. 220, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 220 (1987). Rule 220 requires a party to disclose an expert witness, the subject matter of which he intends to
testify, his conclusions or opinions, and his qualifications no later than 60 days prior to
trial. Id. Rule 219 was amended in 1985 to explicitly cover Rule 220 Interrogatories. ILL.
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for more than two years. 9' The plaintiff also misrepresented cer-

tain information to the trial court and failed to comply with discovery orders. 92 The appellate court viewed the unexplained
noncompliance as dilatory and uncooperative and held that sanctions were necessary and proper.9 3 The appellate court concluded,
however, that the trial court should have imposed progressively
harsher sanctions proportionate to the gravity of the violations
rather than dismiss the plaintiff's action. 94
Because of the drastic nature of a litigation-ending sanction,
courts often are inclined to consider the moving party's diligence
as an important factor in determining the sanction's propriety. For
example, in Williams v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,9" the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision to vacate a
previous order dismissing the plaintiff's action for refusing to respond to production requests and interrogatories. The supreme
court concluded that the discovery problems resulted directly from
the failure of both parties to comply with the rules of the court."
In reaching its conclusion, the court indicated that the more drastic the relief requested, the more necessary the moving party's
compliance with the discovery rules. 97 The court indicated that in
the case of a motion to dismiss, a movant's compliance with Rule
S. CT. R. 219, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 219 (Committee Comments) (Smith-

Hurd Supp. 1989).
91. Kubian, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 193-95, 533 N.E.2d at 23-25.
92. Id. at 193-94, 533 N.E.2d at 23-24. The plaintiff in Kubian made several misrepresentations to obtain extensions of time. Id. at 193-96, 533 N.E.2d at 23-25. For example, after several orders and motions to dismiss, the plaintiff stated that she had disclosed
the expert in a letter to the defendant. Id. at 193, 533 N.E.2d at 23. After the trial court
ordered additional time to comply, the plaintiff sent a letter disclosing the expert. IM at
194, 533 N.E.2d at 23-24. The court later ordered the plaintiff to produce information as
to the expert's qualifications and the plaintiff then claimed that the expert would not
testify. Id. at 194, 533 N.E.2d at 24. Finally, after various additional orders and extensions, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 195, 533 N.E.2d at 25.
93. Id. at 201, 533 N.E.2d at 28.
94. Id. at 201-02, 533 N.E.2d at 28-29. The appellate court indicated that the trial
court should have "fashion[ed] an order fair to defendant but also designed to expeditiously accomplish discovery, such as-but not limited to--one imposing additional sanctions and/or conditioning vacatur of the dismissal order.., on plaintiff's full compliance
.... " Id. at 202, 533 N.E.2d at 29.
95. 83 111. 2d 559, 567, 416 N.E.2d 252, 256 (1981).
96. Id. at 562, 416 N.E.2d at 254. The supreme court held that the plaintiff was
dilatory in supplying the requested documents and that the defendant ignored the requirements of Rule 201(k), which required that every discovery motion set forth a statement that reasonable attempts have been made to resolve the dispute prior to requesting
the court to intervene. Id. at 562-64, 416 N.E.2d at 254-55.
97. Id. at 565, 416 N.E.2d 255.
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201(k) is particularly important. 98
99 the
Correspondingly, in Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co.,
appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of sanctions
against a defendant for failing to answer interrogatories, appear at
depositions, or produce evidence. The appellate court stressed that
before moving for sanctions, the plaintiff never sought a hearing or
ruling from the trial court.1 0o Consequently, the appellate court
determined that in light of the moving party's lack of diligence,
among other factors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to impose sanctions for the defendant's similarly dilatory
behavior.'0 '
Reviewing courts generally are reluctant to approve stringent
sanctions. The trial court's imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.° 2 Trial courts
have broad decisionmaking power to determine which sanctions
are appropriate; this vast discretion is justified on the ground that
the trial court is in the best position to evaluate a party's conduct. 0 3 When a dismissal or default judgment is involved, however, some reviewing courts implicitly give less deference to the
98. Id. The court clarified an earlier confusion that motions requesting drastic relief
were "nonroutine" and not within the purview of Rule 201(k). Id. See Hawkins v. Wiggins, 92 Ill. App. 3d 278, 287, 415 N.E.2d 1179, 1185 (1st Dist. 1980). In Hawkins, the
court inferred that Rule 201(k) did not apply to motions for sanctions because such motions were not routine. Id. This confusion stemmed, in part, from the Committee Commentary to Rule 201(k), which states that the Rule "was designed to curtail undue delay
in the administration of justice and discourage motions of a routine nature." ILL. S. Cr.
R. 201(k), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 201(k) (Committee Comments) (Smith-Hurd
1985).
99. 152 Ill. App. 3d 524, 531-32, 504 N.E.2d 772, 777 (1st Dist. 1987) (no evidence in
the record for failing to appear at deposition).
100. Id. at 532, 504 N.E.2d at 777. But see Hawkins v. Wiggins, 92 Ill. App. 3d 278,
286, 415 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (1st Dist. 1980) (not prerequisite to sanction that moving
party seek order, wait until opponent does not comply, and then bring motion for
sanctions).
101. Bautista, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 532, 504 N.E.2d at 777.
102. Leeson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 190 Ill. App. 3d 359, 366, 546 N.E.2d
782, 787 (1st Dist. 1989); see Ashford v. Ziemann, 99 Ill. 2d 353, 369, 459 N.E.2d 940,
948 (1984) ("only a clear abuse of discretion or an application of an impermissible legal
criteria justifies a reversal of the trial court" (quoting McCabe v. Burgess, 75 Ill. 2d 457,
464, 389 N.E.2d 565, 568 (1979)); see also King v. American Food Equip. Co., 160 Ill.
App. 3d 898, 912-13, 513 N.E.2d 958, 967 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 117 Ill. 2d 544, 517
N.E.2d 1087 (1987) ("no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial
court").
103. Lavaja v. Carter, 153 Ill. App. 3d 317, 324, 505 N.E.2d 694, 699 (2d Dist.),
appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d 560, 515 N.E.2d 110 (1987) (trial court in best position to
determine whether a party's conduct amounts to "deliberate or contumacious flouting of
judicial authority").
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trial court's discretion. For example, in Kubian v. Labinsky, 1°4 the
appellate court determined that a sanction of dismissal may be set
aside if a trial on the merits could be had without hardship or prejudice. The same standard was applied in Nehring v. First National
Bank 105 In Nehring, the appellate court held that although dismissal for noncompliance may be appropriate at times, it is too harsh a
remedy after a party has complied with discovery."
IV.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Illinois courts sanction discovery rule violators on a case-by-case
basis under a remedial theory that focuses on encouraging discovery on the same basis. 107 This remedial approach is both ineffective
and inefficient. The imposition of severe sanctions with a view toward deterring violations in the system as a whole is needed. To
deter noncompliance fairly and effectively, however, there must be
consistency among the Illinois courts so that litigants' duties and
expectations regarding discovery are clearly defined.
A.

The Need to Deter Noncompliance with Discovery Rules
The primary goal of the discovery rules108 - to effectuate resolution of disputes on the substantive merits of claims rather than
on procedural grounds - is reflected in the traditional remedial
approach of awarding sanctions. 109 Under the remedial theory, a
sanction should serve to restore parties to equal positions after a
discovery violation has occurred, either by eliminating any advantage a party has obtained by failing to comply or by compensating
an innocent party for any injury sustained from the noncompliance.110 Accordingly, if a case can be tried on the merits, a sanc104. 178 Ill. App. 3d 191, 197, 533 N.E.2d 22, 25 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 123 111.
2d 559, 535 N.E.2d 402 (1988).
105. 143 11. App. 3d 791, 493 N.E.2d 1119 (2d Dist. 1986).
106. Id. at 800, 493 N.E.2d at 1126 ("once discovery has been fully complied with,
albeit belatedly, a trial on the merits can be had with other sanctions applied").
107. See Note, supra note 11, at 1034 (the approach is lenient and seeks to dispose of
a particular case on substantive grounds); Note, supra note 18, at 150 n.64 (the remedial
purpose rationale focuses on narrow balancing of the parties' interests to the instant
lawsuit).
108. See, e.g., In re Henry, 175 Ill. App. 3d 778, 785-86, 530 N.E.2d 571, 576 (2d
Dist. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 16 and 17 for further reference to the
truth-seeking process.
109. Note, supra note 11, at 1034; Comment, supra note 4, at 787.
110. See Note, supra note 11, at 1034 (traditionally two theories behind discovery
sanctions: compliance and compensation); Note, supra note 18, at 150 (ultimate sanctions
could be imposed only if lesser sanctions could not return litigants in the instant case to
equal positions).
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tion that would end litigation on a procedural technicality never
should be imposed. Such a sanction is not remedial and is inherently at odds with the purpose of discovery."'
A review of case law reveals that Illinois courts continue to adhere to the remedial theory.1' 2 Most courts probably will not impose a severe litigation-ending sanction unless a party's conduct is
characterized by a willful, "deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the court's authority."'1 3 Negligent conduct,
no matter how damaging or prejudicial, rarely will be censured
with a severe sanction of dismissal or default judgment.I 4 Apparently, this relatively high culpability threshold stems from courts
viewing severe sanctions as drastic punishments rather than remedial measures."' In addition, a number of appellate courts still
might vacate a severe litigation-ending sanction if "a trial on the
merits could be had without hardship or prejudice. '"116 The re111. See Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Chicago Black Improvement Ass'n, 148
Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1096, 502 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1st Dist. 1986) (sanctions should be least
drastic available to obtain the goal of discovery in that case; litigation-ending sanctions
are drastic).
112. See supra notes 83-106 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of the
conditions under which a court will impose sanctions.
113. Perimeter Exhibits, Ltd. v. Glenbard Molded Binder, Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 504,
514, 461 N.E.2d 44, 52 (2d Dist. 1984); see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text
(discussing conduct warranting sanctions).
114. See MICHAEL, supra note 2, § 35 (lenient sanctions for unintentional misconduct; harsh sanctions for intentional or willful violations). But see Bailey v. Twin City
Barge & Towing Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 763, 765-66, 388 N.E.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Dist.
1979) (dismissal sanction held proper although conduct was merely characterized as unreasonable). The Bailey facts, however, suggest that the conduct would have warranted
dismissal under the "deliberate contumacious standard." Comment, supra note 4, at 799
n.142.
115. White v. Henrotin Hosp. Corp., 78 II. App. 3d 1024, 398 N.E.2d 24 (1st Dist.
1979). In White, the appellate court commented that:
The entry of a default judgment against a party litigant is a harsh and drastic
sanction. Frequently, the default is visited upon the litigant, as a vicariouspunishment, for the acts or omissions of his counsel. While we recognize that rules
of court must be observed if dockets are to be kept current, yet courts must, in a
proper case, yield the procedural exactitudes to more basic rules of fundamental
fairness.
Id. at 1029, 398 N.E.2d at 27 (quoting Mieszkowski v. Norville, 61 111. App. 2d 289, 297,
209 N.E.2d 358, 362 (1965) (emphasis added)). Some courts disfavor stringent sanctions
because they do not want to penalize clients for the actions of their attorneys. See Stevens
v. International Farm Sys., 56 Ill. App. 3d 717, 720-21, 372 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1978). The
majority of Illinois and federal courts, however, hold the client responsible for his attorney's actions. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962); Savitch v. Allman,
25 Ill. App. 3d 864, 867, 323 N.E.2d 435, 437-38 (3d Dist. 1975).
116. Kubian, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 197, 533 N.E.2d at 25; Nehring, 143 Ill. App. 3d at
803, 493 N.E.2d at 1128; see supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text (Kubian
discussed).
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quirement that a severe sanction be imposed only as a "last resort"117 is further evidence that Illinois wholeheartedly has
accepted the remedial theory.
The remedial approach tends to create serious problems of ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the Illinois judicial system."' The
practice of awarding severe sanctions only after repeated violations
or cases of willful or contumacious misconduct is ineffective. Litigants may be less diligent in conducting discovery knowing that
they may be given "one more chance" to comply with the discovery rules." 9 Inefficiency also results because of the courts' willingness to tolerate repeated violations 2by
making numerous warnings
0
before invoking a severe sanction.
In recent years, these concerns have prompted both judges and
commentators to question the wisdom of the remedial approach to
discovery.1 2' These critics suggest that judicial tolerance of noncompliance with discovery and reluctance to impose harsh sanctions adversely affects the entire litigation system. 22 They suggest
that courts use sanctions, not only to remedy specific instances of
noncompliance but also to deter all litigants from exploiting the
23
rules of discovery.
117. Kubian v. Labinsky, 178 111. App. 3d 191, 197, 533 N.E.2d 22, 25 (1st Dist.
1988); Nehring v. First Nat'l Bank in DeKalb, 143 Ill. App. 3d 791, 803, 493 N.E.2d
1119, 1128 (2d Dist 1986); see supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
118. Comment, supra note 4, at 804-05. Similar problems in the federal courts caused
by the remedial approach led one commentator to note:
The typical pattern of sanctioning that emerges from the reported cases is one
in which delay, obfuscation, contumacy, and lame excuses on the part of litigants and their attorneys are tolerated .... Attorneys are well aware that sanctions will be imposed only in the most flagrant situations.
R. RODES, K. RIPPLE, & C. MOONEY, SANTONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 85 (Federal Judicial Center 1981).
119. See Note, supra note 18, at 143 (remedial theory based on "traditional wisdom"
that parties will comply in the future if given one more chance).
120. The delay caused by noncompliance has become a significant factor in creating a
backlog of cases and congestion of trial calendars. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 IlI. 2d 351,
357, 221 N.E.2d 410, 415 (1965) (noncompliance and judicial intervention in discovery
"serve[s] only to inhibit pretrial settlements, increase the burden of already crowded
court calendars, and thwart the expeditious administration of justice."); Kubian v. Labinsky, 178 111. App. 3d 191, 200, 533 N.E.2d 22, 27 (1st Dist. 1988) ("dilatory and uncooperative conduct of... counsel-by whose actions [parties] are bound-[is] the very type
which places significant burdens on courts struggling to handle the backlog of pending
litigation").
121. Note, supra note 18, at 137; Note, supra note 11, at 1033; Comment, supra note
4, at 773; Renfrew, supra note 36, at 264.
122. See, e.g., Note, supra note 18, at 149.
123. Id. "[T]he overall efficiency of federal administration of civil justice demands a
reduction in the delay caused by discovery noncompliance, and that some litigants must
suffer a severe sanction in order to increase this overall efficiency." Id. The United States
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A minority of Illinois courts have recognized the deterrent value
of sanctions.124 The deterrent theory, however, has not gained the
acceptance needed to solve the problems discovery violations create. 125 Proponents of the remedial theory argue that any societal
interest in deterring future violations should be subordinate to ef1 26
fectuating a decision on the merits in a particular case.
Although commendable, this argument ignores the fact that the
merits can be reached only by strict adherence to the rules;1 27 thus,
the remedial and deterrent theories are not mutually exclusive.
Stricter enforcement of the discovery rules would not only dissipate delay but would discourage a cavalier attitude toward the
rules and satisfy the remedial concerns of a speedy resolution on
the merits.
Supreme Court first voiced acceptance of the deterrent approach in Nat'l Hockey League
v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976):
[Tihe most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must
be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter
those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.
Id. In Nat'l Hockey League, the Court upheld a district court's dismissal with prejudice
of an antitrust action due to the plaintiff's bad faith failure to answer interrogatories. Id.
at 639. For a complete discussion of Natl Hockey League see Note, supra note 11, at
1046-53.
124. See, e.g., Lavaja v. Carter 150 Ill. App. 3d 317, 323, 505 N.E.2d 694, 698 (2d
Dist. 1987). The court in Lavaja stated:
While it is true that the trial court is to seek a means to have discovery accomplished rather than merely to inflict punishment, it is also appropriate to consider the need for using discovery sanctions as a general deterrent which will
provide a strong incentive for all litigants to fully and accurately comply with
discovery rules.
Id. (quoting Perimeter Exhibits Ltd. v. Glenbard Molded Binder Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d
504, 514, 461 N.E.2d 44, 52-53 (2d Dist. 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original));
see also Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 67, 374 N.E.2d 460, 467 (1978) (sanctions will
not be effective unless unhesitatingly imposed); Payne v. Coates-Miller, Inc., 68 Ill. App.
3d 601, 607, 386 N.E.2d 398, 403 (1st Dist. 1979) (same).
125. See, e.g., Nehring v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 I11.App. 3d 791, 804, 493 N.E.2d
1119, 1129 (2d Dist. 1986). In Nehring, the defendant argued that dismissal as a sanction
would act as a deterrent for all litigants, but the court believed dismissal was proper only
in cases of "refusals" to comply and the court did not believe the noncompliance qualified
as a "refusal." Id. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (complete discussion of
Nehring).
126. Note, supra note 18, at 144 (Proponents of the remedial theory argue that its
focus on intentional misconduct achieves the fundamental goal of discovery: a decision on
the merits).
127. Without adherence to the rules, a resolution on the merits cannot be achieved.
This was the purpose for enacting the discovery rules, discussed supra notes 7-17 and
accompanying text.
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B. The Need for Consistency Among the Courts
Deterrence is effective only if a party is aware of what actions
constitute wrongdoing and if he expects to suffer severe consequences. 28 In Illinois, however, the standards for determining
sanctionable conduct and when a severe sanction is warranted are
plagued with inconsistencies. 29 Duties and expectations are not
clearly defined. Before the deterrent value of sanctions can be fully
realized, the Illinois courts must establish a clear standard.
1. Defining Duties: "Unreasonable" Noncompliance
Most of the various approaches highlighted by this Comment
fail to promote the goals of discovery effectively. In order to curb
noncompliance with discovery, litigants must be made aware of
what constitutes sanctionable conduct.131 Guided by the language
of Rule 219(c), the Illinois appellate courts have determined that
noncompliance must be "unreasonable" before sanctions may be
imposed.1 31 The courts, however,
disagree over the definition of
"unreasonable" misconduct.1 32 The most frequently used definition is "deliberate and contumacious disregard for the court's authority,1 33 suggesting that a party's conduct must be willful or
intentional in order to warrant the imposition of a sanction.
The minority approach, the so-called negligence standard, is
preferable.' 34 According to this theory, a finding of willful or in128. Note, supra note 18, at 151. The author states: "Certainty that a particular form
of behavior will result in the imposition of a severe sanction is both the essence of general
deterrence and a prerequisite to a perception of fairness." Id.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 37-106 for a discussion of Illinois case law in
this area; see also Johnston, supra note 4, at 62-63 ("Judicial control over discovery abuse
is not consistently exercised").
130. Note, supra note 18, at 151 nn.67-68. This is also one of the basic premises
underlying Anglo-American criminal law. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scowr, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1.2(b) (2d ed. 1986) ("there must be some advance warning to the public as to what
conduct is criminal and how it is punishable"). But see Note, supra note 18, at 151 n.67
(predictions about the deterrent effect of criminal penalties may not correspond to predictions of the deterrent effect of civil discovery penalties).
131. See supra text accompanying note 38 for another reference to the "unreasonable" standard.
132. See supra notes 41-70 and accompanying text (Some courts define unreasonable
conduct as willful, others as negligent. A few courts judge unreasonableness by considering both parties' conduct during the course of the lawsuit. Still other courts determine
unreasonable conduct by the importance of undisclosed information.)
133. See, e.g., King v. American Food Equip. Co., 160 Il.App. 3d 898, 911, 513
N.E.2d 958, 966 (1st Dist. 1987); Nehring v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 Ill. App. 3d 791, 805,
493 N.E.2d 1119, 1129 (2d Dist. 1986); see supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text
(King and Nehring discussed).
134. See, e.g., Wilkens v. T. Enterprises, Inc., 177 Ill.
App. 3d 514, 517-18, 537
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tentional conduct is unnecessary; a party may be sanctioned for
mere negligence that impedes the discovery process. Once a court
finds that a party has not complied with a rule or order, the burden
shifts to the offending party to tender a defense to excuse the noncompliance. 13 5 The only excuse that will justify non-compliance
will be complete inability to comply with the request; mere inadvertence or oversight is not a satisfactory excuse. 136 This approach
is consistent with the application of Federal Rule 37(b), after
which the Illinois Rule is modeled. 137 Clarification of the culpability standard for sanctionable conduct along these lines would eliminate any confusion with respect to a party's duty regarding
discovery.
Some courts gauge "unreasonable" conduct by the conduct of
the opposing party. 13 The rationale behind this standard is to determine responsibility for noncompliance.' 39 The majority of the
courts have concluded, however, that an opposing party's conduct
should not factor into the analysis of determining "unreasonable"
noncompliance; rather, it should be considered only for purposes
of choosing an appropriate sanction."4 This conclusion is correct
N.E.2d 469, 471 (1st Dist. 1988); White v. Henrotin Hosp. Corp., 78 Ill. App. 3d 1024,
1027, 398 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1st Dist. 1979); O'Brien v. Stefaniak, 130 Ill. App. 2d 398, 405,
264 N.E.2d 781, 785 (1st Dist. 1970); see supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text (Wilkens and White discussed).
135. See supra text accompanying note 42 for further reference to the shifting burden.
136. See Note, supra note 18, at 146 (inability to comply with discovery cannot be
deterred with sanctions, yet "[n]egligent, no less than intentional, wrongs are fit subjects
for general deterrence") (quoting Cine Forty-Second Street Theater Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1064, 1062 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also Payne v. Coates-Miller,
Inc., 68 Ill. App. 3d 601, 606-07, 386 N.E.2d 398, 403 (1st Dist. 1979) (if party fails to
comply because he claims the request is improper, he must seek protective order; he
cannot merely fail to comply); see also supra note 42 (excuses for noncompliance listed).
137. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2281
(1970). FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) was amended in 1970 to change the phrase "refusal to
comply" to "failure to comply" with orders. Id. This was the result of lower courts interpreting the rule to mean that innocent failures were not subject to sanctions. Id. See, e.g.,
Hinson v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 275 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1960) (nonsanctionable
conduct when party failed to appear at physical examination; not "refusal" where party
sick in bed).
138. Spiller v. Continental Tube Co., 95 Ill. 2d 423, 430-31, 447 N.E.2d 834, 837
(1983); see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (Spiller discussed).
139. See supra text accompanying note 70 (conduct not unreasonable when delay
attributable to both parties).
140. Wilkens v. T. Enters., Inc., 177 Ill. App. 3d 514, 517-18, 532 N.E.2d 469, 471
(1st Dist. 1988) (movant's conduct does not factor in determining whether conduct is
unreasonable; it is relevant only to determining the appropriate sanction). But see Fine
Arts Distribs. v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 89 Ill. App. 3d 881, 885, 412 N.E.2d 608, 611 (1st
Dist. 1980) (discovering party's conduct should not be considered in the sanction analysis; a sanction is not a punishment for the offending party nor a reward for the opponent's
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for several reasons.
An opposing party's conduct is only one of the factors enumerated by the Illinois Supreme Court for determining the appropriateness of an exclusionary sanction; it is not an enumerated factor
for determining whether the conduct is sanctionable.1 4 1 In addition, it appears that the only adequate excuse for failing to comply
with a discovery rule is inability to comply.1 42 Because the dilatory
conduct of an opposing party does not satisfy the burden of proving inability or impossibility of compliance, it should not factor
into the determination of the unreasonableness of noncompliance.
Finally, courts have applied another standard for determining
unreasonable noncompliance that is completely inconsistent with
the other standards. This standard judges unreasonableness, not by
the "fault" of the offending party, but by the importance of information withheld by noncompliance. 143 This standard is flawed because it is outcome determinative. 144 For example, an offending
party must argue that undisclosed evidence is unimportant in order
to convince the court not to exclude the evidence. If the evidence is
not important, however, the exclusion does not result in prejudice.
This standard also is unsatisfactory because it places a burden on
litigants and courts to determine the weight given certain evidence.
Such a standard is unworkable and only adds confusion regarding
a party's duty under the rules. The importance of the undisclosed
information would be better considered in the court's decision of
an appropriate sanction.
Another problem with determining sanctionable conduct is that
the courts have not clarified the language of Rule 219(c). 14 Rule
diligence); see also supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (discussing lack of diligence as a factor in imposing sanctions).
141. Ashford v. Ziemann, 99 Ill. 2d 353, 369, 459 N.E.2d 940, 947-48 (1984) (factors
include diligence of adverse party, surprise to the adverse party, and timely objection by
the adverse party); see supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text. But see King v. American Food Equip. Co., 160 Ill. App. 3d 898, 911, 513 N.E.2d 958, 967 (1st Dist. 1987) (the
court considered the Ashford factors in determining unreasonable noncompliance; the
factors, however, did not weigh heavily in the court's analysis); see supra notes 45-50 and
accompanying text (King discussed).
142. See supra notes 42 and 136 (complete inability may be only valid excuse).
143. Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Shevlin-Manning, Inc., 96 Ill. App. 3d 207, 210, 421
N.E.2d 562, 565 (3d Dist. 1981); see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (Ideal
Plumbing discussed).
144. In Ideal Plumbing, the court stated that the "[defendant] is caught on the horns
of a dilemma. If the barred exhibits were as important to [its] case as it claims they were,
then the failure to disclose was unreasonable and there was no error in imposing the
sanction. If, on the other hand, it was not so important... then its exclusion was not
prejudicial." Id at 210, 421 N.E.2d at 565.
145. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 219(c) (1987).
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219(c) is modeled after Federal Rule 37(b).'" Unlike Federal Rule
37(b), however, the Illinois rule makes a distinction between when
a party "unreasonably refuses to comply with [the discovery
48
rules]"' 147 and when it merely "fails to comply with any order."'1
This distinction suggests that there should be two standards for
determining sanctionable conduct under Rule 219(c) because the
term "unreasonably refuses" suggests that a higher degree of culpability is necessary for sanctioning noncompliance with a rule. 149
According to the language of Rule 219(c), when a party does not
comply with a discovery rule, the noncompliance is not sanctionable unless it is "unreasonable." If a party merely "fails to comply"
with an order, however, a sanction may be imposed without a
showing of intent. 5 0 Such a distinction between noncompliance
with rules and orders is logical. Although a party is assumed to
have constructive knowledge of a rule's requirements, it is possible
that a failure to comply with a rule is innocent. A showing of "unreasonable" noncompliance, therefore, seems appropriate. When a
court orders compliance with discovery, however, a party has actual knowledge of required conduct; therefore, a failure to comply
with an order is presumptively intentional. 15' Accordingly, awarding a sanction merely for failing to comply with an order seems
proper. 52
The Illinois courts have not recognized this distinction in Rule
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). See also ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
1 10A, para. 219(c) (Historical and Practice Notes) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
147. ILL. S. CT. R. 219(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 219(c) (1987).
148. Id.
149. Prior to the 1970 Amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b), however, the Supreme
Court refused to make a distinction between "refusals" and "failures" because it was "too
fine a literalism." 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 137, § 2281 (1970); see Societe Internationale Pour Participants Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Roger, 357 U.S. 197,
207 (1958).
150. Comment, supra note 4, at 795-96. "After an order has been entered, the trial
court need only find a 'failure' to comply before imposing a sanction as long as the sanction is not severe. If there has been no previous court order, the court must find that a
party's refusal to comply with a discovery provision is 'unreasonable.' " Id. (footnotes
omitted); see also Johnston, supra note 4, at 63 (suggesting different standards for "failure" to comply with orders and "unreasonable refusal" to comply with rules).
151. The importance of judicial orders was recognized in Payne v. Coates-Miller,
Inc., 68 Ill. App. 3d 601, 607, 386 N.E.2d 398, 403 (1st Dist. 1979), in which the court
stated that "[a] refusal to obey a ... discovery order strikes at the very life-line of the
court ....
'Judicial orders are the most solemn acts of the court, and if they are not
obeyed, they cease to be judicial.' " Id. (quoting Estate of Atwood v. DeDella, 97 Ill.
App. 2d 311, 324, 240 N.E.2d 451, 457 (1st Dist. 1968)).
152. In fashioning the appropriate remedy for noncompliance, however, any extenuating circumstances suggesting that the failure to comply with the order is unintentional
should be considered by the court.
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219(c) and instead require a finding of "unreasonableness" for noncompliance of both rules and orders before imposing a sanction.1 "
Although consistent standards are favored, this consistent treatment of noncompliance with rules and orders does not comport
with common sense.
2.

Defining Expectations: "Just Orders"

The foregoing discussion highlights the need for elucidation
from the Illinois Supreme Court. The discovery system relies primarily on attorneys to resolve discovery disputes with minimal judicial interference." 4 To encourage cooperation and compliance
with the rules, however, attorneys must anticipate sanctions.'" 5 It
is particularly important to a just administration of the discovery
system to clarify litigants' expectations regarding the severity and
certainty of sanctions.
Litigants must expect sanctions to be severe if the sanctions are
to satisfy their purpose. 15 6 To deter violations, a sanction must
send a message to the legal system as a whole, not just the immediate parties, that noncompliance will not be tolerated.15 7 An increased use of severe sanctions as a deterrent, however, raises
serious constitutional issues. 5 s Certainly, severe litigation-ending
153. See supra notes 41-70 and accompanying text, wherein "unreasonableness" is
discussed.
154. But see Renfrew, supra note 36, at 264 (Judge Renfrew's article suggests that the
earliest possible and direct involvement of the court is an important factor in curbing
discovery abuse.)
155. Williams v. A. E. Staley, Mfg. Co., 83 Ill. 2d 559, 563, 416 N.E.2d 252, 254
(1981). In Williams, the court stated that the smooth functioning of the judicial system
relies on "the control exercised by the attorneys themselves, animated by a spirit of cooperation, a fear of reprisal, [and] an appreciation of judicial sanctions available if recalcitrance persists." Id at 564, 416 N.E.2d at 255 (quoting Kaufman, JudicialControl Over
Discovery, Proceedingsof the Seminar on Practiceand Procedure Under the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 111, 116 (emphasis added)); see also supra notes 128 and
130 (referring to the deterrent value of sanctions).
156. See Note, supra note 18, at 151 (certainty and severity of sanctions is the essence
of a deterrent theory). United States District Judge Charles B. Renfrew stated:
Abuse of the judicial process is difficult to detect and prove, and that difficulty
means that abuse that is detected and proven must be dealt with severely. The
lower the probability of detection and proof, the more severe the sanction must
be to deter misconduct effectively
Renfrew, supra note 36, at 275; see supra notes 128 and 130 (sanctions must be certain).
But see Comment, supra note 4, at 784 (unclear as to whether the imposition of severe
and stringent sanctions actually deters litigants).
157. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text, discussing the deterrent value of
sanctions.
158. Note, Johnston, supra note 4, at 64. The fourteenth amendment's due process
clause must be read in conjunction with Rule 219(c). Comment, supra note 4, at 778. The
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sanctions, such as the exclusion of a key witness, are not proper in
all circumstances.1 5 9 Adequate notice of the standards to be used
by the courts for the imposition of severe sanctions is essential.
Most courts consistently require that a party's noncompliance
amount to a "willful, contumacious or deliberate disregard for the
court's authority" before awarding a litigation-ending sanction. 16°
Some courts also apply the same requirement for finding whether
conduct is "unreasonable." ' ' 6' As noted in this Comment's discussion of the Ashford factors, this stricter standard should not be
used to determine whether conduct is sanctionable, but rather
should determine whether a sanction of dismissal or default judgment is appropriate.' 62 However a standard is used, it should be
with clarity and consistency.
Although "unreasonable" conduct that is merely negligent is
sanctionable,' 63 the "willful, contumacious or deliberate" standard
strongly suggests that misconduct must be intentional to warrant a
severe sanction.'64 Commentators have expressed concern that deterrence cannot be achieved with such a high culpability requirement and suggest that negligent or inadvertent conduct should be
sanctioned similarly. 65 One author has suggested that a negligence standard is appropriate because it is the standard for attorney malpractice. 66 Denying a party a day in court because of a
procedural technicality, however, offends both the concept of due
process and the purpose of the discovery rules, unless the party's
due process clause may limit the courts' authority to impose litigation-ending sanctions
unless the conduct is intentional. Societe Internationale Pour Participants Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Roger, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958).
159. See, e.g., Brandon v. DeBusk, 85 Ill.
App. 3d 645, 648, 407 N.E.2d 193, 195-96
(2d Dist. 1980) (drastic sanction of dismissal for failure to comply with discovery should
not be awarded when minors are involved; alternative sanctions should be more extensively pursued).
160. Lavaja v. Carter, 153 Ill.
App. 3d 317, 324, 505 N.E.2d 694, 699 (2d Dist. 1987);
see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
161. See King v. American Food Equip. Co., 160 Ill. App. 3d 898, 911, 513 N.E.2d
958, 966 (Ist Dist. 1987); Nehring v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 InI. App. 3d 791, 802-03, 493
N.E.2d 1119, 1127-28 (2d Dist. 1986); see also supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text
(Lavaja discussed).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 50 and 141, noting that Illinois courts look
to certain factors for determining the appropriateness of the sanction, not for determining
whether the conduct is sanctionable.
163. See supra note 134 for mention of courts that have imposed sanctions for negligent conduct.
164. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (most courts will not impose drastic
sanctions unless conduct is intentional).
165. Note, supra note 18, at 156-57; Note, supra note 11, at 1035 (lowering the culpability standard may be the only way to justify an increased use of harsh sanctions).
166. Note, supra note 18, at 156-57.
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misconduct is intentional.I67 A requirement of intentional or willful noncompliance thus seems to be both an appropriate and reasonable standard.
A successful deterrent approach must foster, not only the expectation of severe sanctions, but also the expectation of certain and
unconditional sanctions. A litigant must expect an immediate, severe sanction for intentional noncompliance and not feel that there
will be "one more chance" to comply.1 68 A number of Illinois appellate courts impose severe sanctions only as a last resort, even if a
party's conduct is "willful, contumacious or deliberate."' 69 This
policy is both ineffective and inefficient. 170
Although arguably one can understand the "last resort" approach when there is noncompliance with a rule, there is no justification for such a weak position when a party has violated a court
order. Once a litigant is ordered to comply with a rule, the court
has already given a second chance to comply. If the litigant
wilfully or deliberately fails to comply with the order, an additional opportunity to comply is unjustified. For deterrence to be
successful, the "last resort" policy of awarding litigation-ending
sanctions should be abandoned.
Inconsistency among the appellate courts must be resolved to
bring home to litigants that they will suffer swift and certain sanctions for noncompliance with discovery orders. Some courts will
vacate a dismissal or default judgment if trial on the merits can be
had without hardship or prejudice.' 7 1 This procedure is so broad
that it encompasses almost every type of sanction and essentially
167. See supra notes 17, 156 and accompanying text; see also People ex rel. General
Motors v. Bua 37 Ill.
2d 180, 190, 226 N.E.2d 6, 12 (1967) (when party fails to comply
with discovery, noncompliance permits an inference that the conduct admits to a meritless claim; however, due process requires that the sanction be limited to that which the
noncompliance relates).
168. See Note, supra note 18, at 143 (the remedial approach is based on the concept
that given one more chance, a party will comply with a discovery request); see also supra
notes 118-19 and accompanying text (remedial approach discussed).
169. Marriage of Kutchins, 157 Ill. App. 3d 384, 389-90, 510 N.E.2d 1300, 1304 (2d
Dist. 1987); see supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text for further discussion of egregious conduct warranting severe penalties).
170. See Comment, supra note 4, at 785-88, 804-05 (discussion of the ineffectiveness
and inefficiency of the remedial application of Federal Rule 37 and Illinois Rule 219).
Not only does the remedial approach of awarding sanctions as a last resort ineffectively
deter future noncompliance, but it adds to congestion and delay in the entire judicial
system. See supra-notes 15, 17 and accompanying text (purpose of modem rules is to
make process more, not less, efficient).
171. Kubian v. Labinsky, 178 Ill. App. 3d 191, 197, 533 N.E.2d 22, 25 (1st Dist.
1988); Nehring v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 Ill. App. 3d 791, 805, 493 N.E.2d 1119, 1129 (2d
Dist. 1986).
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allows the appellate court to replace the trial court's judgment with
its own. As with the "last resort" policy, the continued use of such
a standard will impede any deterrent value of severe sanctions by
the trial courts.17 2 The practice encourages delay in compliance
because the imposition of an immediate sanction is uncertain.
Most appellate courts, however, agree that a trial court's determination of a severe sanction should not be disturbed absent abuse
of discretion.17 3 This standard is consistent with the broad authority given trial courts to impose sanctions. Further, this deferrence
bolsters the deterrent value of sanctions by depriving litigants of
the expectation that the trial court's sanction will be set aside by a
reviewing court." 4
Deterrence encourages all litigants to comply with the rules of
discovery; therefore, duties and expectations must be defined, not
only for noncomplying parties, but also for parties moving to sanction an opponent. This is necessary because some courts consider
the diligence of the moving party when choosing to impose a severe
sanction. 175 Of primary significance is the moving party's compliance with Rule 201(k). 176 The Illinois Supreme Court has stressed
the need to adhere to the Rule's requirements when requesting a
court to impose a severe sanction. '7 Literal compliance with Rule
201(k), however, is not required if the record reflects a genuine
attempt to solve a discovery dispute before requesting the court to
intervene.17 Such a requirement advances the deterrent policy by
encouraging all parties to comply with the discovery rules, and it
adds an element of evenhandedness to the entire procedure.
In sum, the inconsistency of the Illinois courts needs to be re172. Renfrew, supra note 36, at 276. "Trial judges cannot effectively deal with abuse
of the judicial process unless appellate tribunals are willing to back them up." Id.
173. Leeson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 190 111. App. 3d 359, 366, 546 N.E.2d
782, 787 (1st Dist. 1989); see Ashford v. Ziemann, 99 Ill. 2d 353, 369, 459 N.E.2d 940,
948 (1984) ("only a clear abuse of discretion or an application of an impermissible legal
criteria justifies reversal of the trial court"); King v. American Food Equip. Co., 160 Ill.
App. 3d 898, 912-13, 513 N.E.2d 958, 967 (1st Dist. 1987) ("no reasonable man would
take the view adopted by the trial court").
174. See Note, supra note 18, at 151 (to be an effective deterrent a sanction must be
certain and severe).
175. Williams v. A. E. Staley, Mfg. Co., 83 Ill. 2d 559, 562, 416 N.E.2d 252, 254
(1981); Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 524, 532, 504 N.E.2d 772,
777 (1st Dist. 1987); see supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (case discussed).
176. ILL. S. Cr. R. 201(k), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 201(k) (1987); see supra
notes 96-98 and accompanying text, discussing failure to comply as a factor in imposing
sanctions.
177. Williams, 83 Ill. 2d at 565, 416 N.E.2d at 255.
178. See Lavaja v. Carter, 153 Ill. App. 3d 317, 325, 505 N.E.2d 694, 699 (2d Dist.
1987).
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solved in order for deterrence to become effective. This Comment
recommends that first, litigants' duties with respect to discovery
would be clarified if there were a single standard for determining
"unreasonable" misconduct and if the supreme court interpreted
Rule 219(c) to resolve ambiguity. Second, fairness to litigants
would be achieved by demanding. compliance with the requirements of Rule 201(k) upon every motion for severe sanctions. Finally, litigants would know when to expect severe and certain
sanctions if the requisite level of intent for imposition of a severe
sanction were defined, and if the practice of awarding sanctions
only as a "last resort" were abandoned. For a trial court's sanction
to have any "bite," appellate courts should defer, setting aside a
severe sanction only when there has been an abuse of discretion.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois courts sanction noncompliance with discovery rules
under a remedial theory that focuses on encouraging discovery on
a case-by-case basis. This approach is ineffective because it allows
courts to give litigants a second chance to comply with the discovery rules before imposing a sanction, thereby creating delay and
inefficiency in the system as a whole. The courts, therefore, need to
recognize the value of sanctions as a deterrent, and they ought to
impose severe sanctions unhesitatingly whenever they are
warranted.
To deter violations both fairly and effectively, however, litigants
must be aware of their duties with respect to discovery, and they
must anticipate severe sanctions for breaches of those duties. The
ad hoc imposition of sanctions means that parties have no expectations and do not know what is required of them. Moreover, the
"one more chance" and excuse for negligence approaches have resulted in abuse, delay, and lack of respect for the system. This
Comment argues that inconsistency and ambiguity would be eliminated by recognizing that deterrence, although harsh, is critical for
"just" and reasonable control over the discovery process.
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